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Introduction 
In a suit brought by a slaveowner 
against his neighbor in 1827 for the kill-
ing of his slave, the court found that the 
bad character of the slave (caught while 
stealing potatoes from the defendant's 
property) should be taken into account 
by the jury in assessing damages for the 
wrongful destruction of the slaveowner's 
property (1). However, the court warned: 
But where property is in question, 
the value of the article, as nearly as 
it can be ascertained, furnishes a 
rule from which they [the jury] are 
not at I iberty to depart (2). 
Almost 100 years later, another liti-
gant brought suit in Connecticut to recov-
er compensation for the wrongful destruc-
tion (3) of his personal property, which 
was shot while similarly trespassing on a 
neighbor's property. This time the plain-
tiff's personal property was his dog. In 
reaching its conclusion that the plaintiff 
was entitled to recover for the loss of his 
dog, the court reaffirmed the well-estab-
lished common law property status of 
animals: 
It [the statute] attaches to the right 
of property, including a recovery of 
damages under circumstances where 
such a recovery would be allowed for 
other kinds of personal property (4). 
That slaves were viewed as nothing 
more than the personal property of their 
owners had never been seriously question-
ed. One of the earliest treatises on Brit-
ish law makes note of this status, and it 
adds an interesting comment on animal 
rights. In distinguishing serfs, who did 
have recognized legal rights, from slaves, 
Maitland notes: 
In relation to his lord the general 
rule makes him rightless ... the state 
is concerned to see (only] that no one 
shall make an ill use of his property. 
Our modern statutes which prohibit 
cruelty do not give rights to dogs 
and horses ... (5). 
The most well-known legal state-
ment on the personal property status of 
American black slaves makes it clear that 
this view was never seriously questioned. 
They had for more than a century 
before been regarded as beings of 
an inferior order, and altogether un-
fit to associate with the white race, 
either in social or political relations; 
and so far inferior, that they had 
no rights which the white man was 
bound to respect· and that the negro 
might justly and lawfully be reduc-
ed to slavery for his benefit. .. This 
opinion was at that time fixed and 
universal in the civilized portion of 
the white race. It was regarded as an 
axiom in morals as well as in politics, 
which no one thought of disputing, 
or supposed to be open to dispute; 
and men in every grade and position 
in society daily and habitually acted 
upon it in their private pursuits, as 
well as in matters of public concern, 
without doubting for a moment the 
correctness of this opinion (6). 
Enforced and maintained by a legal 
superstructure that regulated every as-
pect of a black's social, political, econo-
mic, and religious life, his property sta-
tus continued until the middle of the 
nineteenth century when Congress passed 
the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to 
the Constitution, which overturned the 
Vincent P. McCarthy, University of Bridgeport School of Law, 303 University Avenue, Bridgeport, CT 06601. 
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Ored Scott decision and recognized that 
a black human being had legally pro-
tectible rights. 
There are some signs in recent legal 
decisions that a similar evolution in the 
status of animals is taking place: judges 
are beginning to draw distinctions be-
tween animals and property. 
But can we ever expect that the 
courts will grant full liberation to ani-
mals from their status as property? 
Blacks, although universally considered 
inferior to whites, were always consider-
ed to be members of the same species as 
whites. Does this taxonomic distinction 
between animals and man doom efforts 
to enhance their legal status? Although 
most states still view animals as the per-
sonal property of their owners (7). recent 
cases have begun to question this doc-
trine by rejecting its jurisprudential 
basis in the context of mounting scien-
tific, sociological, and philosophical 
evidence to the contrary. More impor-
tant, these decisions have in common a 
profound sense of disbelief in the pre-
sent status of animals as property, based 
on an experience of animals that does 
not fit with their status as objects no 
more valuable than furniture or a televi-
sion. It is at this most basic level of law 
as a formalized reflection of experience 
that the legal rights of animals have be-
gun to grow and take shape. 
Sentimental Value 
In 1975, a suit (Stettner vs. Craubard) 
was brought in a New York lower court 
to recover the $220 cost of veterinary ser-
vices required for injuries to a dog (8). In 
opposition to this claim, the defendant 
argued: 
1. That damages cannot exceed the 
market value of dog regardless of how 
high the veterinary bills run; and 
2. That a dog's market value is its 
purchase price minus depreciation. 
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In short, the measure of damages for the 
death or injury to a dog was asserted to 
be the same as might be applied in the 
case of an automobile or any other item 
of personal property (9). 
After noting that the purchase price 
is only one factor to be considered in as-
certaining the market value of a dog, the 
court listed "other relevant factors" in-
cluding the dog's age, health, usefulness, 
and any special traits or characteristics 
of value. But the court also held that 
Sentiment, however, may not be con-
sidered since that often is as much a 
measure of the owner's heart as it is 
of the dog's worth (1 0). 
Although the actual purchase price 
of the dog had been $125 to $150, the 
court found that the dog had a market 
value of $200. The rejection of sentimen-
tal value as a measure of recovery is 
consistent with the majority view, al-
though many courts have sharply limited 
their definition of sentimental value in 
other personal property cases (11 ). The 
problem in the issue of sentiment is real-
ly an evidentiary one (12); sentimental 
value can be approached more practically 
when considered under the rubric of theo-
ries such as companionship, loss of use, 
or mental anguish. 
Much of what was lost in Stettner 
has been regained in two more recent 
New York lower-court decisions. On July 
10, 1980 the New York Law journal pub-
lished a small-claims opinion that ex-
panded the measure of recovery for the 
death of an animal to include a pecunia-
ry award for loss of companionship (13). 
The plaintiff, Mrs. Brousseau, delivered 
her healthy 8-year-old dog for boarding 
at Dr. Rosenthal's kennel. When she re-
turned to the kennel she learned that her 
dog had died. In her suit, which charged 
negligence, the court awarded her $550, 
plus costs for her loss. 
Despite the fact that the compen-
sable loss was suff~red by the owner and 
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not by the dog, Brousseau significantly 
enhances the basic concept of an animal's 
value. As another New York lower court 
stated recently: 
This court now overrules prior pre-
cedent and holds that a pet is not 
just a thing but occupies a special 
place somewhere in between a person 
and a piece of personal property. 
In ruling that a pet such as a dog is 
not just a thing I believe the plain-
tiff is entitled to damages beyond 
the market value of the dog. A pet is 
not an inanimate thing that just re-
ceives affection; it also returns it (14). 
Animals, or at least those animals 
that we call pets, are to be viewed in 
legal contexts as more than property, 
not just because of their special value to 
their owners but more importantly be-
cause, intrinsically, they are considered 
as being more valuable than mere prop-
erty. Other kinds of personal property 
may be important and valuable to their 
owners, but animals respond- they are 
alive. 
An heirloom while it might be the 
source of good feelings is merely an 
inanimate object and is not capable 
of returning love and affection; it 
has no brain capable of displaying 
emotion which in turn causes a hu-
man response. Losing the right to 
memoralize a pet rock, or a pet tree 
or losing a family picture album is 
not actionable. But a dog; that is 
something else ... (15). 
Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages are awarded to a 
party who has established that his loss 
was caused by a willful or malicious act 
or an act of reckless indifference to the 
rights of others (16). Such damages are 
normally recoverable for the willful or 
wanton killing of an animal (17). and it is 
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not essential to gammg a recovery for 
punitive damages that the owner of the 
animal establish any special value for it. 
It is the nature of the act that provides 
the grounds for awarding the measure of 
rei ief, although the compensatory or 
punitive nature of the relief may differ 
among jurisdictions (18). 
Recently, larger awards for punitive 
damages reflect an increased awareness 
of the value of animals. In one case the 
court affirmed a jury verdict for punitive 
damages against a policeman who malici-
ously killed the plaintiff's cat (19). In an-
other decision (La Porte vs. Assoc. Inde-
pendents, Inc.), the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida affirmed a punitive award of $1,000 
for the malicious killing of a pet dog by 
a garbage collector (20). 
Mental and Emotional Distress 
In the La Porte decision referred to 
above, the court was called upon to de-
cide whether damages for mental and 
emotional distress should be permitted 
in a suit for the killing of an animal. The 
plaintiff saw a garbage collector kill her 
dog by hurling an empty garbage can at 
him, and a physician testified that a pre-
existing nervous condition of the plain-
tiff was exacerbated by the incident. Aft-
er noting, with deference to tradition, 
that it was improper to allow recovery 
for the sentimental value of the dog, the 
court concluded: 
The restriction of the loss of a pet 
to its intrinsic value in circum-
stances such as the one before us is 
a principle we cannot accept. With-
out indulging in a discussion of the 
affinity between "sentimental val-
ue" and "mental suffering," we feel 
that the affection of a master for his 
dog is a very real thing and that the 
malicious destruction of the pet pro-
vides an element of damage for which 
the owner should recover, irrespec-
tive of the value of the animal be-
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cause of its special training such as 
a Seeing Eye dog or sheep dog (21). 
Similarly in Texas, a court recently 
upheld an award of $200 for mental pain 
and suffering when an owner's dog was 
wrongfully shot by a policeman on the 
property of the owner (22). The dog had 
been raised by the owner since he had 
been purchased at the age of 11 days. 
These two cases represent a signifi-
cant departure from the traditional forms 
of recovery for "property" loss. An in-
dividual is not permitted damages for 
mental and emotional distress for the 
destruction of her car or her furniture. 
Property, by its very nature, is assumed 
not to evoke this kind of emotional re-
sponse. It does not have life and therefore 
cannot respond, and cannot provide friend-
ship or companionship. The focus of the 
harm in all of these cases is admittedly 
some human who has suffered a loss, but 
it is the changing way in which we view 
animals that has altered the definition of 
that loss. So the courts are being forced 
to address the legal status of animals as 
a prerequisite to granting relief to hu-
man claimants. 
Guardianship 
But what about the question of 
harm to animals themselves? Can an ani-
mal gain recovery for injury sustained 
through a wrongful act? What about the 
practical problems involved in bringing 
a suit and distributing recovery? Not 
members of our species, animals would 
need a representative through which their 
claims could be presented. Such an ap-
proach was suggested by Justice Douglas 
of the United States Supreme Court when 
he urged that standing be granted to 
governmental or public interest groups 
to litigate on behalf of 
298 
The pileated woodpecker as well as 
the coyote and bear, the lemmings 
as well as the trout in the streams (24). 
A similar "guardianship" model al-
Comment 
ready permits suits to be brought on be-
half of ships and corporations (25). The 
interests of fetuses are considered in 
granting the right to abortion (26), and 
the right of parents to sue for prenatal 
injuries (27). Are fetuses or corporations 
more deserving of legal recognition and 
protection than animals? On what grounds? 
That the fetus may suffer? That the cor-
poration may be deprived of some econo-
mic interest without due process? Do we 
explain the differences in protection by 
noting the human ownership of corpora-
tions and the fetus's potential for human 
life? 
To do so would be to beg the ques-
tion of the bases on which we assign the 
ownership of such rights. Why do we 
limit legal interests to humans or human 
creations? Henry Salt, Peter Singer, and 
others have argued persuasively that the 
biological, behavioral, and cognitive dif-
ferences between the human and other 
animal species are hollow justifications 
for the continued failure to recognize 
the interests of animals. 
Conclusion 
Although the cases discussed above 
mark a significant departure from the 
traditional common law approach toward 
animals, the focus of harm and protecti-
ble interest remains with the human who 
is asserting ownership of the animal. It is 
the owner who is considered to have suf-
fered some loss through the invasion of 
a legally cognizable interest, and it is the 
owner who receives compensation for his 
or her loss. In order to fully I iberate 
animals from their status as personal 
property, courts must begin to look for 
interests which are inherent to the ani-
mals themselves that have been invaded, 
and then fashion some legal protection 
for those interests. 
However, I am confident that courts 
will continue to expand the domain of 
animal rights through the "owners' rights 
/NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 3(4) 1982 
V.P. McCarthy 
bootstrap" approach. As the owners of 
animals assert more aggressively their 
rights to the friendship, companionship, 
and assistance of animals, courts and 
legislatures will become more sensitive 
to the importance and value of animals. 
And, while this article has focused prin-
cipally on companion animals, with a 
few exceptions it can be argued that 
changes in the rights of companion ani-
mals will effect corresponding changes 
for all animals. 
When this process has reached the 
point at which the interdependence of 
human and animal becomes clear, the 
law will begin to focus on the specific in-
terests of animals themselves, consider-
ed separately from their value as subor-
dinates. An animal will then be seen as 
an autonomous being, with interests that 
are worthy of consideration equal to 
those of human beings; these will not be 
the same interests, but rather, different 
ones that are similarly deserving. 
This change will take place as a 
consequence of efforts to enlarge the 
sphere of human interests assigned to 
the owners of animals and to thereby in-
crease the pecuniary rewards for the 
successful assertion of these interests. In 
order to address this issue, the law will 
have to focus on precisely what the hu-
man has lost. A thorough investigation 
and evaluation of this loss will result in 
better understanding of the sentient, cog-
nitive, and biological relationships be-
tween human and animal (28). Inevita-
bly, some owner or animal group will 
eventually introduce a breakthrough case, 
on behalf of an animal, in which a court 
will award damages for the loss to the 
animal himself. These damages will be 
awarded as compensation for losses rel-
ative to interests that will have become 
legally recognized as established in-
terests of animals, according to the pre-
cedents set by the "bootstrap" analysis 
(29). Some of these interests are already 
in the process of being defined; for ex-
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ample, the rights to life and humane treat-
ment, which were established in the cases 
described above. Other interests will 
probably be defined soon- these include 
adequate food and shelter and some stan-
dard for freedom of movement. 
Ironically, this process in the legal 
sphere will find its culmination when hu-
man and animal recognize what has al-
ways been true: that they are mutually 
dependent on each other for survival, 
meaning, and happiness, on an unknown, 
and mysterious planet. 
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ship or companionship. The focus of the 
harm in all of these cases is admittedly 
some human who has suffered a loss, but 
it is the changing way in which we view 
animals that has altered the definition of 
that loss. So the courts are being forced 
to address the legal status of animals as 
a prerequisite to granting relief to hu-
man claimants. 
Guardianship 
But what about the question of 
harm to animals themselves? Can an ani-
mal gain recovery for injury sustained 
through a wrongful act? What about the 
practical problems involved in bringing 
a suit and distributing recovery? Not 
members of our species, animals would 
need a representative through which their 
claims could be presented. Such an ap-
proach was suggested by Justice Douglas 
of the United States Supreme Court when 
he urged that standing be granted to 
governmental or public interest groups 
to litigate on behalf of 
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the coyote and bear, the lemmings 
as well as the trout in the streams (24). 
A similar "guardianship" model al-
Comment 
ready permits suits to be brought on be-
half of ships and corporations (25). The 
interests of fetuses are considered in 
granting the right to abortion (26), and 
the right of parents to sue for prenatal 
injuries (27). Are fetuses or corporations 
more deserving of legal recognition and 
protection than animals? On what grounds? 
That the fetus may suffer? That the cor-
poration may be deprived of some econo-
mic interest without due process? Do we 
explain the differences in protection by 
noting the human ownership of corpora-
tions and the fetus's potential for human 
life? 
To do so would be to beg the ques-
tion of the bases on which we assign the 
ownership of such rights. Why do we 
limit legal interests to humans or human 
creations? Henry Salt, Peter Singer, and 
others have argued persuasively that the 
biological, behavioral, and cognitive dif-
ferences between the human and other 
animal species are hollow justifications 
for the continued failure to recognize 
the interests of animals. 
Conclusion 
Although the cases discussed above 
mark a significant departure from the 
traditional common law approach toward 
animals, the focus of harm and protecti-
ble interest remains with the human who 
is asserting ownership of the animal. It is 
the owner who is considered to have suf-
fered some loss through the invasion of 
a legally cognizable interest, and it is the 
owner who receives compensation for his 
or her loss. In order to fully I iberate 
animals from their status as personal 
property, courts must begin to look for 
interests which are inherent to the ani-
mals themselves that have been invaded, 
and then fashion some legal protection 
for those interests. 
However, I am confident that courts 
will continue to expand the domain of 
animal rights through the "owners' rights 
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bootstrap" approach. As the owners of 
animals assert more aggressively their 
rights to the friendship, companionship, 
and assistance of animals, courts and 
legislatures will become more sensitive 
to the importance and value of animals. 
And, while this article has focused prin-
cipally on companion animals, with a 
few exceptions it can be argued that 
changes in the rights of companion ani-
mals will effect corresponding changes 
for all animals. 
When this process has reached the 
point at which the interdependence of 
human and animal becomes clear, the 
law will begin to focus on the specific in-
terests of animals themselves, consider-
ed separately from their value as subor-
dinates. An animal will then be seen as 
an autonomous being, with interests that 
are worthy of consideration equal to 
those of human beings; these will not be 
the same interests, but rather, different 
ones that are similarly deserving. 
This change will take place as a 
consequence of efforts to enlarge the 
sphere of human interests assigned to 
the owners of animals and to thereby in-
crease the pecuniary rewards for the 
successful assertion of these interests. In 
order to address this issue, the law will 
have to focus on precisely what the hu-
man has lost. A thorough investigation 
and evaluation of this loss will result in 
better understanding of the sentient, cog-
nitive, and biological relationships be-
tween human and animal (28). Inevita-
bly, some owner or animal group will 
eventually introduce a breakthrough case, 
on behalf of an animal, in which a court 
will award damages for the loss to the 
animal himself. These damages will be 
awarded as compensation for losses rel-
ative to interests that will have become 
legally recognized as established in-
terests of animals, according to the pre-
cedents set by the "bootstrap" analysis 
(29). Some of these interests are already 
in the process of being defined; for ex-
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ample, the rights to life and humane treat-
ment, which were established in the cases 
described above. Other interests will 
probably be defined soon- these include 
adequate food and shelter and some stan-
dard for freedom of movement. 
Ironically, this process in the legal 
sphere will find its culmination when hu-
man and animal recognize what has al-
ways been true: that they are mutually 
dependent on each other for survival, 
meaning, and happiness, on an unknown, 
and mysterious planet. 
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The Economics 
of Farm Animal Welfare 
A.J.F. Webster 
The number of ways that one can 
be nice or nasty to animals are legion. 
This article will consider only one very 
specific aspect of farm animal welfare, 
namely, those systems of intensive ani-
mal production in which the system it-
self, irrespective of the quality of the 
stockmanship within the system, appears 
to restrict the normal behavior of farm 
animals to an unacceptable degree. The 
systems that were considered by the 
House of Commons Select Committee 
on Agriculure (1981) include egg produc-
tion from hens in battery cages, produc-
tion of veal from calves deprived of 
solid food and isolated in wooden crates, 
and the most intensive aspects of pig 
production, namely, cages for weaners 
and stalls, with or without tethers, for 
dry sows. 
In their most extreme form, the bat-
tery cage, the veal calf crate, and the 
dry sow stall represent the absolute lim-
its to intensification, since the floor 
space allocated to each animal is, in ef-
fect, no greater than- and sometimes less 
than- the floor space occupied by the 
animal when it adopts a normal resting 
position. Table 1 illustrates examples of 
floor space allocations for hens, pigs, 
and calves in commercial intensive units 
and compares some of these with the rec-
ommendations in the revised drafts of 
the Welfare Codes. 
The Farm Animal Welfare Council 
has been criticized for recommending 
space allowances in excess of those cur-
rently being used in commerce, without 
providing substantial scientific evidence 
to show that the welfare of laying hens 
would be significantly improved by in-
creasing floor space per bird from, say, 
400 to 650 sq em. The advocates of in-
tensive systems contrast this lack of sci-
entific evidence in favor of increased 
space allowances with the benefits that 
have accrued from intensification, not 
only in terms of animal production, but 
also in terms of animal health. For exam-
ple, it is much easier to control respiratory 
disease and parasitism in laying birds 
kept in cages than in those housed on 
deep I itter. 
It is, however, impossible to argue 
that the policy of space restriction sum-
marized in Table 1 arose out of any posi-
tive concern for animal welfare. In order 
to generate as much gross income as pos-
sible and, more important, to stay com-
petitive, producers have simply jammed 
animals in as tightly as possible. If these 
intensive producers are moved by com-
passion for their animals, it has not af-
fected their actions in this regard. In the 
U.K. at least, there are no limits imposed 
on a farmer's right to crowd his animals 
to the absolute limit, and while this situ-
ation persists the intensive farmer has 
little option but to do just that, if he 
wishes to retain his competitive position 
in the market. 
Space Restriction and Stress 
As indicated above, there is I ittle 
clear evidence to show that extreme space 
restriction affects the performance of 
farm animals or induces disturbed be-
havior. This is not altogether surprising, 
since it is difficult to construct ethological 
experiments designed to reveal disturbed 
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